- Agents Please code review guide: Use a repeatable process for AI-assisted pull request reviews.
- First priority: Confirm scope, permissions, secrets, and the exact revision under review.
- Best workflow: Scan broadly, trace risky data flows, then validate findings manually.
- Main warning: Treat generated findings as hypotheses until a developer reproduces them.
- Final check: Require tests, patch review, and regression coverage before approval.
Agents Please Code Review Guide: Scope and Safety
The Agents Please code review guide is designed for teams using an AI agent to inspect pull requests, repositories, or isolated code samples. The goal is not to replace reviewers. It is to make review preparation faster, surface security-sensitive paths, and give human engineers a clearer list of questions to investigate.
Begin with a narrow review boundary. Identify the branch, commit, changed files, programming languages, test commands, and directories the agent may access. A restricted scope makes results easier to audit and reduces the chance that unrelated legacy code overwhelms the review.
Never provide production credentials, private keys, customer records, or unrestricted shell access merely to improve review coverage. Use a disposable checkout, least-privilege tokens, and sanitized fixtures whenever possible.
Review boundaries
| Review Item | Recommended Decision | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|
| Commit or pull request | Record an exact revision | Prevents findings from drifting as code changes |
| File scope | Include changed files plus direct dependencies | Balances context with manageable output |
| Secrets | Remove, revoke, or mask them | Limits accidental exposure |
| Tools | Allow read-only search first | Reduces unintended modifications |
| Test commands | Approve only safe, deterministic commands | Avoids destructive scripts and network side effects |
What a useful review should answer
A strong AI-assisted review should help answer five questions:
- What changed, and which behavior does it affect?
- Where does untrusted input enter the system?
- Which functions, services, or permissions receive that input?
- What evidence supports each reported issue?
- What test or patch would reduce the risk?
A report that only lists generic concerns is less useful than a shorter report with file paths, affected symbols, data-flow reasoning, and a practical verification step.
Scope
- Exact commit
- Changed files
- Related dependencies
- Review exclusions
Security
- Secret handling
- Permission limits
- Input boundaries
- External calls
Evidence
- File and line
- Reproduction path
- Confidence level
- Assumptions
Resolution
- Suggested patch
- Regression test
- Owner
- Verification status
Prepare an AI-Assisted Review
Preparation determines whether an agent produces actionable analysis or a noisy collection of guesses. Before starting, write a short review brief in plain language. Include the feature goal, expected trust boundaries, known sensitive operations, and areas that must not be modified.
For a web service, the brief may identify authentication, authorization, file uploads, background jobs, third-party requests, database writes, and model or prompt integrations. For a library, it may emphasize unsafe parsers, serialization, dependency changes, and public API compatibility.
Ask the agent to explain how input travels from source to sink. This is usually more valuable than asking it to “find all bugs,” because the narrower instruction produces evidence that a reviewer can challenge.
Review brief template
| Brief Section | Example Content | Review Benefit |
|---|---|---|
| Feature goal | Adds user-configurable webhook alerts | Defines intended behavior |
| Trust boundaries | User settings reach an outbound HTTP client | Highlights possible SSRF risk |
| Sensitive assets | Tokens, tenant data, internal metadata | Establishes impact |
| Required checks | Authorization, URL validation, error handling | Creates a focused checklist |
| Verification | Unit tests plus mocked network requests | Defines completion criteria |
A practical instruction set
Use instructions that separate discovery, reasoning, and reporting:
- Map the changed code and its direct callers.
- Identify external input, sensitive data, privileged operations, and network requests.
- Trace suspicious values through validation, transformation, storage, and output.
- Report only issues supported by code evidence.
- Distinguish confirmed defects, plausible concerns, and questions for the author.
- Suggest tests without applying changes unless explicitly authorized.
This structure also helps prevent a common failure mode: the agent notices a dangerous pattern but does not check whether a validator, framework control, or upstream permission already prevents exploitation.
Freeze the Review Target
Record the repository, branch, commit hash, and changed-file list. If the pull request changes during analysis, restart or clearly mark the new revision.
Describe the Trust Model
Identify anonymous users, authenticated users, administrators, service accounts, background workers, and third-party systems. State which roles may access each affected operation.
Define High-Risk Sinks
Highlight database queries, file parsers, template rendering, outbound requests, shell commands, deserialization, credential use, and permission checks.
Request Evidence-Based Findings
Require a path, symbol or line range, input source, dangerous operation, impact, confidence, and a suggested verification method for every finding.
Review the Output Manually
Reproduce important claims, inspect nearby code, check existing controls, and decide whether the issue is valid, mitigated, or incorrect.
Prioritize Findings and Trace Data Flow
AI code review becomes more effective when findings are ranked by exploitability and impact rather than by how alarming the wording sounds. A missing comment and a user-controlled server-side request should not receive equal attention.
Start with pathways that connect untrusted input to privileged or externally visible behavior. Common examples include request parameters reaching database queries, uploaded content reaching parsers, configurable URLs reaching HTTP clients, or user text being inserted into instructions for another model.
A high-confidence issue may have limited impact, while a severe issue may remain unconfirmed until the environment is understood. Track confidence and impact separately in the report.
Finding classification
| Finding Type | Evidence Standard | Reviewer Action |
|---|---|---|
| Confirmed defect | Clear path and missing control | Reproduce, patch, and add regression coverage |
| Likely concern | Strong pattern but incomplete context | Inspect dependencies and surrounding logic |
| Design question | Behavior may be intentional | Ask the owner to clarify the trust model |
| False positive | Existing control blocks the path | Document the control and close the finding |
| Informational | Maintainability or hardening issue | Schedule according to team priorities |
Risk triage matrix
| Impact | Confidence | Priority |
|---|---|---|
| High | High | Immediate investigation |
| High | Medium | Validate before merging |
| Medium | High | Fix in the current change when practical |
| Medium | Low | Request more context |
| Low | Any | Batch with maintenance work |
When reviewing a suspected vulnerability, ask the agent to show the complete chain:
- Source: Where does the value originate?
- Transformation: Is it decoded, parsed, concatenated, or normalized?
- Control: What validation, authorization, encoding, or allowlist applies?
- Sink: Which operation uses the value?
- Impact: What could an attacker or malfunctioning user cause?
- Verification: What safe test demonstrates the claim?
For example, an outbound request is not automatically a server-side request forgery issue. The reviewer must establish whether an attacker can influence the destination, whether private or metadata addresses are reachable, whether redirects are controlled, and whether the application has an approved destination policy.
Similarly, a string inserted into a prompt is not automatically a successful prompt injection. The review should identify the model boundary, the authority of the generated output, the available tools, and whether untrusted content is clearly separated from system instructions.
Review Security-Sensitive Patterns
A focused review should examine patterns that frequently create defects without assuming every match is exploitable. The following categories are useful starting points for an Agents Please workflow.
Use harmless proof-of-concept values and redact tokens, personal data, internal hostnames, and destructive commands. A review report should demonstrate risk without becoming an attack recipe.
| Pattern | Questions to Ask | Safer Review Signal |
|---|---|---|
| Outbound HTTP request | Can users control the scheme, host, port, or redirects? | Validated destinations and restricted network access |
| Database query | Is input bound as data or joined into query text? | Parameterized queries and narrow permissions |
| File upload | Are type, size, name, and storage location constrained? | Randomized names, isolated storage, safe parsing |
| Template or HTML output | Is untrusted content encoded for its output context? | Context-aware escaping and safe rendering |
| Authorization check | Is access checked server-side for every object? | Centralized policy plus ownership validation |
| Prompt construction | Can untrusted text override task boundaries? | Delimited content, constrained tools, output validation |
| Deserialization | Can attacker-controlled data select classes or behavior? | Safe formats and explicit schemas |
| Tenant or account context | Can a caller choose another scope directly? | Server-derived context and authorization checks |
Patch review standards
A proposed fix should address the cause rather than only hide the reported symptom. Check whether it:
- Validates input at the correct trust boundary.
- Preserves expected behavior for legitimate users.
- Applies authorization to every relevant code path.
- Handles failures without leaking sensitive details.
- Includes a regression test that would fail without the fix.
- Avoids introducing a second bypass through alternate endpoints or background jobs.
Input Controls
Validate format, length, encoding, and allowed values before dangerous operations.
Access Controls
Derive identity and scope from trusted server context, then enforce object-level permissions.
Output Controls
Encode, filter, constrain, or review data before returning it to users, interpreters, or external services.
Finish the Review and Track Fixes
The review is not complete when the agent produces a report. It is complete when the team has decided which findings are valid, assigned owners, applied appropriate fixes, and verified that the change behaves safely.
Keep accepted findings separate from unresolved questions. This prevents a long report from obscuring the small number of issues that block release. It also creates a useful history for future reviewers who may encounter the same code path.
Approve only after the important findings have a disposition: fixed, mitigated, accepted with an owner, or closed with documented evidence. “The agent says it is safe” is not a sufficient disposition.
Review completion table
| Stage | Required Evidence | Completion Signal |
|---|---|---|
| Discovery | Scope and changed-file map | Reviewer understands the change |
| Analysis | Findings with paths and reasoning | Claims can be challenged |
| Triage | Impact and confidence labels | Priorities are clear |
| Remediation | Patch and regression test | Root cause is addressed |
| Verification | Tests, manual checks, or safe reproduction | Fix works as intended |
| Closure | Owner, status, and rationale | Review record is auditable |
Code Review Completion Checklist:
- Confirm the exact commit and review scope
- Remove secrets and restrict agent permissions
- Trace untrusted input to sensitive operations
- Classify findings by impact and confidence
- Verify fixes with tests or safe reproduction
- Record accepted risks and unresolved follow-up work
A useful final report is concise but specific. For each accepted issue, include the affected component, risk, evidence, recommended fix, owner, and verification status. For each rejected issue, record the control or assumption that made it invalid. This reduces repeated investigation during later pull requests.
If the same false positive appears often, improve the review instructions or add repository guidance. If the same real defect appears repeatedly, invest in a shared helper, framework control, lint rule, test fixture, or architectural change instead of relying on repeated manual detection.
Save short examples of accepted findings, rejected findings, and preferred fixes. Over time, these examples make future agent instructions more precise and help human reviewers calibrate their judgment.
FAQ: Agents Please Code Review Workflows
Q: What is the safest way to start an Agents Please code review guide workflow?
Start with a disposable checkout, an exact commit, read-only tools, sanitized data, and a narrow file scope. Ask the agent to map the change before requesting security findings.
Q: Should an AI-generated vulnerability block a pull request immediately?
Not by itself. Treat the report as a hypothesis, then check the complete data flow, existing controls, exploitability, and expected behavior. Block only after a qualified reviewer confirms the risk or the team adopts a documented policy.
Q: How should prompt injection concerns be reviewed?
Identify which content is untrusted, where it enters the prompt, what authority the model has, which tools or actions are available, and how outputs are validated. The risk depends on the complete system boundary, not string interpolation alone.
Q: What makes a code review finding actionable?
An actionable finding names the affected file or symbol, explains the input-to-sink path, describes realistic impact, states confidence, proposes a targeted fix, and includes a safe verification method.
Use AI to expand review coverage and organize evidence, but keep scope control, risk decisions, and final approval with accountable human engineers.